A New Criminal Code for Maryland? by Brumbaugh, John M.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 1 Article 2
A New Criminal Code for Maryland?
John M. Brumbaugh
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Brumbaugh, A New Criminal Code for Maryland?, 23 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1963)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol23/iss1/2
Maryland Law Review
VOLUME XXIII WINTER, 1963 NUMBER 1
A NEW CRIMINAL CODE FOR MARYLAND?
By JOHN M. BRUMBAUGH*
There has been considerable recent interest in funda-
mental revision of the criminal law of Maryland. In 1960
the Maryland Self-Survey Commission, originally ap-
pointed by Governor McKeldin, reported to Governor
Tawes a Proposed Criminal Code.' The Maryland State
Bar Association now has this question under considera-
tion.2 This article will examine the need for a new criminal
code and suggest how such a code may best be formulated.
Before what should be done can be decided, it is neces-
sary to have in mind what now exists.
THE PRESENT MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW
Analytically, the constitutions of the United States and
the State furnish the starting point for Maryland criminal
law. The federal constitution has considerable importance
in indicating the limits of permissible state criminal pro-
cedure, but its bearing on state substantive criminal law
is relatively slight. While it may strike down a state
statute for vagueness3 or for infringement of some con-
stitutionally guaranteed right,4 or may permit Congress
to pre-empt a field and oust state legislation, 5 the federal
constitution remains in the background as far as the
problems of substantive criminal law are concerned.
Similar limiting safeguards in the Maryland constitution
* B.A., 1948, Swarthmore College; LL.B., 1951, Harvard University;
Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1STATE OF MARYLAND, FOURTH AND FINAL REPORT OF MARYLAND SELF-
SURVEY COMMISSION, RELATING TO PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE (1960). The
Report contains the text of a proposed code and valuable notes on the
sources of the provisions.
2The writer acted as a consultant to the draftsmen for a small portion
of the original draft of the proposed criminal code and is a member of
the committee of the Maryland Bar Association charged with considera-
tion of the problem. This article does not purport to represent the views
of anyone but the writer.
'E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
' E.g., Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
'E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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must be borne in mind,6 but the principal source of our
law of crimes is Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights,
which provides in part:
"That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to
the Common Law of England... and to the benefit of
such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth
day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and
which, by experience, have been found applicable to
their local and other circumstances, and have been
introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law
or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force
on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-
seven; except such as may have since expired, or
may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Con-
stitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this
State."
So the basis of our criminal law is "the Common Law
of England." In an early case an older version of the
present Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights is described
as having reference
"to the common law in mass, as it existed here, either
potentially, or practically, and as it prevailed in Eng-
land at the time, except such portions of it as are
inconsistent with the spirit of that instrument, and
the nature of our new political institutions."
British and American judicial decisions and the writings
of recognized authorities, as modified by early British and
American statutes, provide the starting point for our
present law." For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that
this starting point is by its nature vague in its provisions
and that there is no single authoritative or complete ex-
position of the contents of this early law.
Apparently, the first attempt of our legislature to deal
systematically with the law of crimes came in 1809.' The
preamble to the resulting act states as a reason for the
legislation that:
6 See, e.g., Loughran Co. v. Candy & Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A. 2d
201 (1940) (construing Article 23 of the DECLARATION OF RIGHTS).
State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 358 (1821).
8 See CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES (6th ed. 1958) §§ 1.03, 1.04, for a
discussion of the nature of the common law of crimes and its reception on
this side of the Atlantic, including references to Maryland- authority.
See ALEXANDER, BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND (2d ed. 1912),
for an attempted compilation of the British statutes received under
Article 5 of 'the DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.
'MD. LAWS 1809, Ch. 138. The act was actually passed January 6, 1810.
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"it frequently happens, that men resigning themselves
to the dominion of inordinate passion, commit great
violations upon the lives, liberties or property, of
others, which it is great business of the laws to
protect and secure, and experience evinces that the
surest way of preventing the perpetration of crimes,
and of reforming offenders, is by a mild and justly
proportioned scale of punishments...."
The act is concerned primarily with the problem of pun-
ishment. In many cases the statute, when it deals with
particular crimes, does nothing more than refer to a
common law crime, without defining it, and announce a
penalty. For example:
"Every person duly convicted of the crime of man-
slaughter shall be sentenced to undergo a confinement
in the said penitentiary for a period not more than
ten years, to be dealt with as hereinafter directed."'
A second group of crimes is derived from common law
offenses and builds on them by way of sub-division or
extension of the common law idea. For example, without
defining murder, the statute divides it into degrees:
"And whereas the several offences which are included
under the general denomination of murder, differ so
greatly from each other in the degree of their atro-
ciousness, that it is unjust to involve them in the
same punishment; therefore, Be it enacted, That all
murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any kind of wilful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, any arson, or to burn any barn, tobacco-
house, stable, warehouse, or other out-house, not par-
cel of any dwelling-house, having therein any tobacco,
grain, hay, horses, cattle, or goods, wares and mer-
chandise, rape, sodomy, mayhem, robbery or bur-
glary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and
all other kind[s] of murder shall be deemed murder
in the second degree ....
The words between "arson" and "rape" illustrate an exten-
sion of the common law crime of arson for purposes of
- MD. LAws 1809, Ch. 18, § 4 (3).
n MD. LAws 1809, Ch. 138, § 3.
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the felony-murder rule, and they reflect the statute's ex-
tension of arson-like crimes.12
Finally, there are some crimes which either were un-
known to the common law or were so altered that fairly
complete definition was required:
"Every person or persons duly convicted of wilfully
and maliciously stabbing, killing or destroying, any
horse, mare, gelding, colt, ass or mule, not the prop-
erty of such person, and not in the act of trespassing
on his enclosures, shall undergo a confinement in the
penitentiary house for a period not less than one year
nor more than four years, to be treated as hereinafter
directed."'13
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the statute of
1809 to the modern lawyer is its close resemblance to
Article 27 of the Maryland Code today. A large number
of provisions have survived in practically identical form.
Today's statutes form the same classes as those identified
in the 1809 legislation; the same practice of building on the
common law where possible, and of bothering to define
only where there is no convenient common law concept,
is apparent.
The strong staying power of the 1809 provisions is
seen when we consider the fate of each of the substantive
provisions of chapter 138, as shown by the following
classification:
Sections of 1809 act repealed4
2 (1) : Treason.
2 (2): Negro insurrection.
2 (4): Counterfeiting gold or silver coin.
6 (4): Destroying horses, etc.
6 (5): Ship stealing.
6 (9): Forging bank notes.
7 (3): Importing felons, convicts, and slaves.
'2See MD. LAWS 1809, Ch. 138, §§ 5 (2) and (3). The felony-murder rule
was not applied to all of these arson-like crimes.
" MD. LAWS 1809, Ch. 138, § 6 (4).
1, Designations of offenses, e.g., "Treason", are unofficial and are intended
only to give a general idea of the nature of the offense.
In some cases there are modern offenses which overlap these repealed
provisions. The Negro insurrection statute appears as Art. 30, § 87, of
the CODE OF PUBLIC GENERAL LAWS (1860), but seems to have been re-
pealed at or prior to MD. LAWS 1888, Ch. 74, adopting the 1888 Code. The
statute against destroying horses was repealed by MD. LAWS 1953, Ch. 407,
and all of the remaining provisions listed were repealed by a general
statute getting rid of a number of obsolete crimes, MD. LAws 1953, Ch. 411.
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Sections of 1809 act substantially changed"
5 (1), (2), and (3), and 8 (6) and (7): Arson and
related burning offenses. (Almost nothing of the original
scheme of 1809 is left. Principal changes were effected by
MD. LAWS 1929, ch. 255. Present provisions will be found in
§§ 6-11.)
7 (2): Gaming. (Very little of the original simple
provision remains. Piecemeal changes brought about
gradual evolution into the present §§ 237-264A.)
8 (4): Bribery of Judges, etc. (An entirely new form of
words was adopted in MD. LAWS 1868, Ch. 369. More recent
changes have made explicit or enlarged the classes of
persons to whom the provisions apply. The present provi-
sion is § 23.)
Sections of 1809 act only slightly changed 6
3 (in part) and 4 (1) - now §§ 407-410, 413: First degree
murder. b-
4 (5) - now § 385: Cutting out tongue, etc. (The only
substantive change here is that the original required intent
to "maim or disfigure" and the present act requires in-
tent to "mark or disfigure." The change appears to have
been made in MD. CODE, P.G.L. (1860), Art. 30, § 121.)
4 (6) -now § 461: Rape.'k (A new provision that
proof of penetration, without proof of emission, is suffi-
cient appears in MD. CODE, P.G.L. (1860), Art. 30, § 161.)
4 (7) - now § 462: Carnal knowledge.' 6
4 (9) - now § 12: Assault with intent to rob, murder,
or rape.6" (The crime is made a felony and different
maximum punishments are now provided for different
branches of the crime. Such changes in punishment were
effected by ID. LAWS 1908, Ch. 366, MD. LAWS 1941, Ch.
722, and MD. LAWS 1949, Ch. 196; the crime was made a
felony by MD. LAWS 1943, Ch. 402.)
4 (10) - now § 337: Kidnapping.16
5 (4) -now § 29: Burglary.')
5 (5) - now § 32: Certain forms of breaking.161
5 (6) -now § 33: Breaking and stealing.16 c
Is Section references to current provisions in this classification are to
3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, as amended.
16 There is some difficulty in classification, particularly as between this
and the preceding category. Changes are regarded as "substantial" if little
or nothing of the original language remains. The changes classified as
"slight" usually involve (aside from minor style changes and provisions
for alternate penalties) only one or more of the following: (a) a breaking-
up of offenses, originally covered in 'one or two sections, into more sec-
tions; (b) a change (usually an extension) in enumerated persons,
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6 (1) - now § 340: Grand larceny.16b (This offense
was expressly designated a felony by MD. LAWS 1933
(Sp. Sess.), Ch. 78, § 318).
6 (3) - now § 348: Stealing horses, etc.eb
6 (6) -now §§ 341, 342: Petty larceny, or breaking
and stealing small amount. 16 bc (The word "feloniously"
was omitted from the description of the petty larceny
portion of this offense by ND. LAws 1933 (Sp. Sess.),
Ch. 78, § 319.)
6 (7)- now § 343: Robbery or larceny of choses in
action.16
b
6 (8) - now § § 466, 467: Receiving stolen goods.oab
6 (10) -now § 44: Forging deeds, wills, bonds, notes,
etc.
16b
7 (1) -now § 18: Polygamy (bigamy). (MD. LAWS
1937, Ch. 142, clarified the effect of annulment or divorce
in the first marriage.)
7 (4) - now § 490: Rogues and vagabonds. 6b (The
original provision required "an intent feloniously to break
and enter" in the first branch of this offense, "intent
feloniously to assault" in the second branch, and "intent
to steal" in the third. By MD. LAws 1878,- Ch. 467, the
intent description for the third branch remained un-
changed, but the intent descriptions for the first and
second branches were changed to read, respectively, "at
places and under circumstances from which an intent may
be presumed feloniously to break and enter" and "at places
and under circumstances from which may be presumed
an intent feloniously to assault.")
Sections of 1809 act not materially changed7
2 (3) - now § 46: Counterfeiting public seals.
3 (in part) and 4 (2) -now §§ 411, 414: Second degree
murder.
actions, or things to which the provisions apply, unaccompanied by change
in the underlying scheme, conception, or language (of. extension of the
original statutory prohibition by addition of separate sections building on
the original idea, discussed infra in the text accompanying note 32);
(c) a change in the maximum term of imprisonment or in the death
penalty.
Changes falling into these categories are indicated by fodtnote references
to the appropriate letter or letters. E.g., the note "16abc" to the first
item in the present category stands for first degree murder changes in
(a) further subdividing the original sections, (b) extending the felony-
murder rule to the crime of escape, and (c) providing life imprisonment
as an alternative to the death penalty. Other changes of any importance
are specifically indicated in the text.
17 Nothing more than slight changes in style or punishment variations
not affecting the death penalty or maximum term of imprisonment is
involved in the crimes in this category.
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4 (3) - now § 387: Manslaughter.
4 (4) -now § 384: Mayhem.
4 (8) -now § 553: Sodomy.
6 (2) - now § 486: Robbery.
7 (5) - now § 234: Fugitive felons.
8 (1)- now § 439: Perjury and subornation of per-
jury. (additional acts have been made perjury and subor-
nation of perjury by §§ 435, 437, and 438.)
8 (2) -now § 126: Embezzling wills, deeds, records,
etc.
8 (3) - now § 45: Forging public documents.
8 (5) -now § 26: Bribing jurors.
As indicated before, the embryo code of 1809 was in no
sense complete; its principal purpose was to provide defi-
nite punishments for most of the important offenses. A
number of crimes, dealt with by statute before 1809,
and still in existence in some form today, were omitted
from the 1809 statute."8 A number of offenses were dealt
with by statute neither then nor now, but are purely
common law crimes.19
The 1809 act has been dealt with at some length because
there does not appear to have been any fruitful general
reconsideration of Maryland criminal legislation since that
day.20 In 1860, in what seems to be the first attempt to
'a E.g., MD. LAWS 1715, Ch. 27 (adultery); MD. LAws 1798, Ch. 101,
Sub-Ch. 2, § 1, (destroying or secreting wills) ; MD. LAws 1728, Ch. 7, § 7
(hunting on another's land); and MD. LAWS 1713, Ch. 2 (lopening letters
without permission). The modern counterparts of these old laws are
respectively 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §§ 4, 127, 268 and 354.
,Early session laws of Maryland are not easily available in the original
publications. References to such laws enacted before 1800, here and in
subsequent notes, can be found in several collections. The writer has used
KILTY, THE LAws OF MARYLAND (2 v. 1799-1800), where the enactments
then in force are arranged chronologically.
"Perhaps the most conspicuous example is simple assault. Hobbs v.
Warden, 223 Md. 651, 163 A. 2d 331 (1960). Other purely common law
crimes dealt with recently by the Court of Appeals are indecent exposure,
Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 130 A. 2d 578 (1957) ; some forms of forgery,
Reddick v. State, 219 Md. 95, 148 A. 2d 384 (1959), cert den., 360 U.S.
930 (1959); and resisting arrest, Preston v. Warden, 225 Md. 628, 169
A. 2d 407 (1961) cert. den., 366 U.S. 974 (1961).
o There was an abortive effort early in this century. MD. LAws 1908,
Ch. 325, and MD. LAws 1910, Ch. 345, provide for a Governkr's Commission
to draft a bill "revising, making harmonious and rearranging systemati-
cally the criminal statutes now in force in Maryland," and for review by
a Court of Appeals Commission. A report of the Maryland Bar Association's
vote favoring such a bill, following debate, will be found in REPORT OF THE
TwELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
(1907) 207. But the new criminal code, Bagby reports in his preface to
volume 3 of the ANNOTATED CODE OF PuimIc GENERAL LAws (1912) - not
published until 1914 due to anticipation of the new code, "did not
materialize."
Pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 2, MD. LAws 1952, p. 331, a com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Hon. John E. Raine accomplished a
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produce a complete and orderly collection of the criminal
statutes, the alphabetical classification of the present day
was adopted. 21 The modern series of codes begins with
Article 27 of POE'S CODE OF PUBLIC GENERAL LAWS of 1888.
This has since periodically gone through new editions.22
Throughout the years, legislatures have added new ideas
piecemeal, as necessary, and the legislators and codifiers
have sifted out certain of the obsolete provisions. But
there has been no fundamental structural change and
relatively little redrafting of old provisions.
Typical historical development of an offense can be
illustrated in common law23 perjury (in a judicial pro-
ceeding) and false swearing (in other proceedings). Bit
by bit, a kind of coral reef is built by legislative accretion
on the underlying common law crime. The original
colonial perjury statute of 1692 provided:24
"That if any person or persons, after the publication
hereof, either by subornation, unlawful procurement,
sinister persuasion, or means of any other, or by their
own act, consent or agreement, wilfully and cor-
ruptly, commit any manner of willful perjury, by
their deposition in any court of record in this prov-
ince, as aforesaid, or being examined in perpetuam rei
memoriam; that then every person and persons so
offending, and being thereof duly convicted or at-
tainted by the laws of this province, shall, for his or
their said offence, lose and forfeit twenty pounds
sterling, and suffer imprisonment in the space of six
months, without bail or mainprise; and the oath of
such person or persons so offending, from thenceforth
not to be received within any court of record within
this province, until such time as the judgment given
useful preliminary step to a general reconsideration of the criminal law in
recommending the repeal of a number of obsolete laws. Repeal was
accomplished by MD. LAWS 1953, Ch. 411, referred to 8upra, note 14.
MD. CODE PUBLiO GENERAL LAWS (Scott & M'Cullough 1860). There
was also an interesting code in which the arrangement of topics and
sections was logical rather than alphabetical. REvisE CODE OF PUBLIC
GENERAL LAWS (Mayer, Fischer & Cross 1879), legalized by MD. LAWS
1878, Ch. 196. There are collections of statutes dating back to colonial
times, but all prior to 1860 that the writer has seen are arranged chrono-
logically. The most famous of the colonial works is BACON, LAws or
MARYLAND AT LARGE (1765). Interesting material on the colonial "codes"
will be found in WRoTH, A HISTORY OF PRINTING IN COLONIAL MARYLAND
(1922) 22-26 and 95-210.
9 There were revisions by Poe in 1904, Bagby in 1912 (criminal code in
1914) and 1924, and Flack in 1939 and 1951. The current revision (Michie
1957) is kept current by supplements.
See CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES (6th ed. 1958) § 14.03.
MD. LAWS 1692, Ch. 16, § 4.
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against the said person or persons shall be reversed,
by attaint, or otherwise, as aforesaid; and that, upon
every such reversal, the parties grieved to recover
their damages as aforesaid. And if it happen that the
said offender or offenders, so offending, shall not have
goods and chattels to the value of twenty pounds,
that then he, she or they, be set on the pillory next
adjoining to the place where he, she or they shall
be convict, as aforesaid, and to have both ears nailed,
and be from thenceforth to be discredited and disabled
for ever to be sworn in any of the courts of record
aforesaid, until such time [as] the said judgment be
reversed; upon which he, she or they, shall recover
his, her or their damages, in manner and form as is
before mentioned; the one moiety of all the said fines
and forfeitures, to be to our sovereign lord and lady,
the king and queen, for the support of government;
and the other moiety to such person or persons as
shall be grieved, hindered or molested by reason of
any [of] the offence or offences before mentioned, that
will sue for the same, by action of debt, bill, plaint or
information, or otherwise, in any court of record
within this province, wherein no essoin, protection, or
wager of law shall be allowed."
The act was confirmed by M/b. LAWS 1705, Ch. 8. In 1763
its provisions were extended to oaths required to be made
by assignors of obligations under seal before suit could be
brought on behalf of the assignees.2 5
The statute of 1809 - more austerely - provided:26
"Every person who shall be duly convicted of the
crime of perjury ... shall be sentenced to undergo a
confinement in the penitentiary-house herein after
mentioned for a space of time not less than five nor
more than ten years, to be treated as hereinafter di-
rected."
MD. LAws 1828, Ch. 165, § 6, extended the penalties of
perjury to cases of false testimony before commissioners
appointed to take depositions in civil cases. In 1858 an
act was drafted to deal with some other cases of false
swearing; 7 and in Article 30, § 155, of the 1860 code, the
former provisions were extended to read:
25 MD. LAWS 1763, Ch. 23, §§ 10, 11.
"MD. LAWS 1809, Ch. 138, § 8 (1), now 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27,
§ 439.
'MD. LAws 1858, Ch. 414, § 10, now 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 435.
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"An oath or affirmation if made wilfully and falsely
in any of the following cases, shall be deemed per-
jury: first, in all cases where false swearing would
be perjury at common law; secondly, in all affidavits
required by law to be taken; thirdly, all affidavits to
accounts or claims made for the purpose of inducing
any court or officer to pass such accounts or claims;
fourthly, all affidavits required to be made to reports
and returns made to the General Assembly or any
officer of the government."
By MD. LAws 1894, Ch. 262, the 1809 act was amended
in its penalty provision so as to assume its present form:2"
"Every person who shall be convicted of 'perjury'
* . . shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the jail or
penitentiary for not more than ten years."
At the same time it was provided in a new section:29
"Any person who shall make oath or affirmation to
two contradictory statements, each of them in one of
the cases enumerated in. . . [what is now 3 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 27, § 435] and in either case shall make
oath or affirmation wilfully and falsely, shall be
deemed guilty of perjury; and to sustain an indict-
ment under this section it shall be sufficient to allege
and prove that one of the said two contradictory
statements is or must be false and wilful, without
specifying which one."
In AID. LAWS 1945, Ch. 95, a simplified indictment
form for perjury was set out.3 0 In 1957 affidavits or
affirmations made pursuant to the Maryland Rules were
brought under the provisions of the present § 435.1
In the case of perjury, the elaboration of the crime took
place through the addition of a section expanding the
definition of common law perjury and other sections
dealing with indictment and proof. The original section
which derives from the act of 1809 is hardly changed. In
some offenses the expansion of the common law has been
by way of amendment of the original section. For example,
until 1918, Mn. LAws 1809, Ch. 138, § 6(3), dealing with
the theft of horses, mules, and the like, remained virtually
2Originally MD. LAws 1809, Ch. 138, § 8 (1), now 3 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 27, § 439.
1Mo. LAws 1894, Ch. 262, § 226A, now 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27,
§ 437.
10 This provision is now 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 436.
"IMD. LAws 1957, Ch. 399, § 17.
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unchanged; the growing importance of the automobile
required the legislature in that year to expand the section
to include motor vehicles.2
Even in the few cases in which the wording of 1809
underwent radical changes, the underlying concepts have
not changed much. This can be seen in arson and the
related offenses. The original arson provision 3 did not
define common law arson, but merely stated the penalty
for it. The modern provision 34 can be regarded as a spell-
ing out of the common law definition with specific modi-
fications. The central mental element of wilfullness and
malice and the physical element of burning remain. Re-
vision comes in expanding the list of things the burning
of which is arson, in providing related crimes dealing with
intentionally defrauding insurers or setting fires while
committing other crimes, and in extending the crime of
common law attempt in the arson field.33
It is fair to conclude that there has been little funda-
mental change in those statutory crimes which have per-
sisted from 1809 to the present day, and these crimes
include most of the important ones. Of course, a great
many provisions have been added since 1809, aside from
those, discussed previously, which have merely extended
the original ideas to new situations or changed penalties.
Some have given statutory recognition to common law
crimes excluded from the 1809 act.3 6 Other statutes have
created new crimes to meet new problems of public safety
and order, e.g., narcotic drugs8 7 and machine guns.3 8 A
great many regulatory offenses, dealing with public health
or undesirable commercial practices, have been added.3 9
]8MD. LAWS 1918, Ch. 422, § 293. Where such a change was effected by
amendment of the 1809 section Itself, It falls into the class Identified as
(b) in note 16, supra. Where the expanding enactment left the wording of
the original section untouched, and added other sections, such identifica-
tion Is not made. Assuming changes such as the one now under discussion to
be the only ones made, such a case would appear in the note 16 classification
under Section8 of the 1809 act not materially changed, Instead of Section8
of the 1809 act only 8lightly changed. For the present purpose - illus-
trating the process of building on the foundation of 1809 - it of course
makes no difference whether the draftsmen choose to add a new section
or merely a new phrase to the old section.
MD. LAws 1809, Ch. 138, § 5 (1).
1'3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 6.
8The burning offenses are now found in 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27,§§ 6-11.
"E.g., conspiracy. See 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §§ 37, 39, 40 and 3
Mn. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 27, § 38.
873 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §§ 276-306.
" 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §§ 372-383.
8See, e.g., 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §§ 191 (dealing with fraudulent
use of trade names) and 321 (dealing with the slaughter of animals for
food).
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Most of these probably belong elsewhere - in separate
articles, like the traffic code - because of rather remote
relation to the true problems of crime.
In summary, the present criminal code has a common
law base. Gradual and rather haphazard additions have
been made extending the common law ideas to new situa-
tions. Some new crimes have been added, and some
public welfare, or regulatory offenses have been placed in
with the crimes.40
While in one sense this describes the history of Mary-
land criminal law, in another sense it might be said that
Maryland had virtually no criminal law, and therefore
virtually no historical development of criminal law, until
about 1950, at which time a dormant code, built in the
dark and without plan, suddenly came to life.
Prior to a constitutional amendment in 1950, Maryland
juries were judges of law as well as of fact.4 In addition
to the usual jury power to bring in an incontestable, even
if irrational verdict of acquittal, a Maryland jury could
bring in an irrational conviction, not subject to judicial
correction for errors of substantive criminal law. So,
when convicted of false pretenses, it was pointless for the
defendant to argue to judges that the evidence showed no
crime but larceny; such a determination was the jury's
alone.42 The Court of Appeals seldom had occasion to
pass on points of substantive criminal law.4"
,0 The proper subject matter for a criminal code is a difficult matter in
borderline areas. It is characteristic of most things usually regarded as
crimes that they involve a seriously blameworthy state of mind in the
violator and a potential threat to the social order sufficient to warrant a
sentence of imprisonment in a substantial portion of the cases. In mere
regulatory offenses the mental element tends to be unimportant, punish-
ment is generally no more serious than a fine, and a serious moral censure
by the community is generally absent. Classifying these offenses as crimes
may confuse public attitudes toward crime, either by bringing unjustly
intense moral censure down upon one who may not be guilty even of care-
lessness, or by encouraging a casual attitude towards crime because some
"crimes" are seen to be trivial or even blameless. A classic exposition of
these minor regulatory offenses is Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933).
" MD. CONST. Art. XV, § 5. This amendment has been part of the
Maryland constitution since 1851; prior to that time the supremacy of thejury seems to have been in doubt, and practice varied within the state.
See Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
34, 34-38 (1943).
0 Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 167 A. 60 (1933).
See casenote, Difficulty of Obtaining Appellate Rulings on Substantive
Criminal Law - Corroboration of Accomplices, 1 Md. L. Rev. 175 (1937).
The author points out that under the old rule matters of substantive
criminal law could reach the Court of Appeals only on rulings on demurrers
to indictments, rulings as to the relevancy of proffered evidence, or by
way of civil cases involving incidental points of criminal law. Although
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Although the opinions of the Court of Appeals prior to
the 1950 amendment contain a few helpful discussions of
points of substantive criminal law," these hardly form a
significant exposition either of the common law of crimes
or of the meaning of specific language in criminal statutes.
And even in the relatively few cases in which the court
spoke, its words were not binding on later triers of fact 4 5
as to the definitions of crimes. The substantive criminal
law of Maryland prior to 1950 could be plausibly main-
tained to be what each jury, or court sitting as a jury,
happened to think it was in the particular case before it;
and the triers of fact did not spell out in any detail what
they thought. They were not required to give reasons for
results, write opinions, or pay any attention to what other
triers of fact had done or learned authorities had said.
Whatever continuity and coherence the law of crimes had
was due to the control which the actions of judges, the
choices of prosecutors, and the arguments of counsel
exercised as a practical matter over what got before the
jury.
The uncertainty resulting from this practice may have
contributed to the prevalent Maryland practice of waivingjury trials in criminal cases. Where the court sitting as ajury was the ultimate judge, it was at least possible to
make legal arguments to men trained in the law. In a jury
trial, counsel's arguments on the law were to the jury.46
The amendment to the constitution in 19504 allowing
the court to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction, and the accompanying Maryland
the trial judge could be reversed for erroneous instructions to the jury,
he was not required to give the jury any instructions at all, and he
usually did not do so. The court could not pass on the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict.
"See e.g., State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (1821) (conspiracy, arising
on demurrer to the indictment); Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809(1888) (insanity test, arising on evidence ruling); Insurance Co. v.
Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 182 A. 421 (1936) (felony-murder rule, arising in a
civil case).
When the court tried a criminal case without a jury, its decisions had
the same finality as a jury's, and the sufficiency of the evidence was not
reviewable. See e.g., Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410, 20 A. 2d 146 (1941).
"Counsel were free to argue against the trial judge's expressed view of
the law - assuming the trial judge saw fit to express any view; in
fact, the Court of Appeals suggested that it was better practice for the
trial judge to give any instructions only after counsel had argued to thejury, 'to spare counsel the embarrassment of contradicting the judge!
Vogel v. State, 163 Md. 267, 162 A. 705 (1932). Unless the case is taken
from the jury altogether because of insufficiency of the evidence, counsel
may still argue law to the jury. iSchanker v. State, 208 Md. 15, 116 A. 2d
363 (1955).
'7 Art. XV, § 5.
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Rules,4" which in effect allow a motion for directed verdict
of acquittal, reviewable if denied, and require instructions
to the jury on request of counsel, have brought about a
sudden change. The defects and uncertainties of the
present law are becoming visible as important criminal
law decisions begin to come down from the Court of
Appeals.4 9 The time is ripe for a reconsideration of our
criminal law.
A NEW CRIMINAL CODE: AVAILABLE SOURCES, AND
ADVANTAGES OF ADOPTION
If adoption of a new criminal code is worth serious
consideration, how can such a code be created? What are
the available sources? An existing code or codes can be
taken as a model, to serve as a kind of first draft of a
Maryland code, or the draftsmen might start afresh, with-
out any model. While the latter procedure cannot be im-
mediately dismissed, it has great disadvantages. A code so
produced, if a good one, would be costly, long in produc-
tion, and would require much highly skilled effort. Since
a number of recently produced codes of high quality, most
notably the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code,
are available, it would seem sensible to use one or more
of these as a starting point.
The present Maryland criminal code should not be used
as the first draft. As discussion of its history has shown,
it does not possess the coherence and uniformity neces-
sary for a model. It should of course be used for purposes
of comparison and to help make sure that nothing that the
new code ought to contain is overlooked. It may even
furnish some useful provisions in specific instances; the
point here to be made is simply that as a starting point
for drafting, it would be hard to imagine a worse candidate
among those models likely to be considered. Perhaps it
would be well to demonstrate its inadequacy by a few
examples.
Whatever might have then been said for the sentencing
provisions of 1809, the Topsylike growth of the code has
left us with sentencing provisions which are now logically
indefensible. This is easiest to see in a small area of
similar crimes. Consider the penalties for various forms
" The current versions of these rules are found in MD. RULEs OF PROCE-
DURE (1961) Rules 755 and 756.
"Recent decisions covering wide ground include Faulcon v. State, 211
Md. 249, 126 A. 2d 858 (1956) (intentional murder) ; Nolan v. State, 213
Md. 298, 131 A. 2d 851 (1957) (larceny and embezzlement) ; and Midgett
v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A. 2d 209 (1958) (kidnapping).
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of non-violent theft. Historical accident has left us with
five separate offenses here, aside from the statutory dis-
tinctions between grand and petty forms of stealing based
on the value of the goods taken. The mental elements of
these offenses do not differ very significantly; roughly,
they all require an intent to deprive the possessor or
owner more or less permanently of his interest, without
claim of right. The original offense, common law larceny,
at first dealt only with those cases involving a trespassory
interference with the rights of the possessor. Although
the courts extended the crime by fictions to certain situa-
tions in which it was difficult to make out a trespass,
legislation was eventually needed to punish more subtle
malefactors. This legislation created a number of new
crimes on the border of common law larceny. In Mary-
land, the results of this legislation can be seen in the
following currently existing theft offenses: 50
1. Common law larceny, divided into two offenses
according to the value of the stolen goods (§§ 340,
341).
2. Embezzlement, where the thief, in a designated
position of trust, innocently receives possession for
the person trusting him from a third person and later
wrongfully appropriates the goods (§ 129).
50 Only the major divisions are here considered. Larceny, embezzlement,
and false pretenses each have a number of specialized subdivisions. For
larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses, respectively, see 3 MD. CODE
(1957 and Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 27, §§ 340-352, 126-138, and 140-149 plus
a number of the fraud provisions at §§ 159-233. (Hereinafter in the
discussion of the Maryland theft and breaking offenses, current section
references are to 3 MD. CODE (1957 and Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 27).
To these crimes might be added two others where the intent is slightly
different, in that the actor means to deprive only temporarily. Many of
such trespassory takings are punished by § 349, carrying a maximum
penalty of four years imprisonment or $100 fine or both. Misappropriations
by bailees for hire, 'by § 5, carry a lesser maximum penalty of six months
in jail or $100 fine or both. Section 5 would presumably be interpreted
to cover cases of intent to deprive permanently, not all of which fall
within § 353 (larceny after trust), because § 353 requires entrusting
"for the purpose of applying the same for the use and benefit of the
owner or person who delivered the goods," an element which would be
lacking, say, in the typical automobile rental situation. Note that in such a
bailment for hire, a bailee who got the goods by trick, under circum-
stances not amounting to false pretenses, or who received the goods
innocently and later broke bulk and took away part of them with intent
to deprive permanently, would be guilty of larceny by early cmmon law
authority. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (1957) 202-204, 218. Since that
portion of the field is occupied by the crime of common law larceny, it
presumably would not be covered by the statutory offense of § 5. For
this reason, § 5, insofar as it deals with the case of a bailee for hire
receiving innocently and misappropriating, without breaking bulk, and
with intent to deprive permanently, is included in the table and dis-
cussion of the central theft provisions which follows in the text.
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3. Larceny after trust, similar to embezzlement,
except that the thief gets possession from the person
trusting him rather than a third person; divided into
two offenses according to the value of the stolen goods
(§ 353).
4. Appropriation by bailee for hire, dealing,
among other things, with such a bailee who, without
breaking bulk, misappropriates the bailed goods, not
having had the intent to do so from the beginning
(§ 5).51
5. False pretenses, dealing with the obtaining of
title by means of a false pretense (§ 140).
There ,is no good reason why the penalties for these
similar crimes should not be identical, or at least similar.
Factors which may properly bear on sentence in an indi-
vidual case, e.g., the value of the goods taken, the breach
of a fiduciary obligation, the amateur or professional
nature of the theft enterprise, cross the lines of the
offenses and are not well reflected in the present statutory
scheme. Consider the current maximum penalties for
the theft offenses:






































For further explanation of § 5, see note 50, supra.
The suggested division ignores some of the subtleties (e.g. the servant
wh o get mere custody from his master is guilty of larceny raither than
larceny after trust). It is based on the assumption that the Maryland
Court of Appeals, which has not yet passed on some of these distinctions,
will follow the usual practice of construing these offenses to be mutually
exclusive. See Nolan v. State, 213 Md. 298, 314, 131 A. 2d 851 (1957),
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Since so much of the definition of crime remains based
in the common law, the punishment provisions of the
Maryland code are probably its most significant feature.
A general reconsideration of punishment provisions, not
only in the theft area, is overdue.5"
Another illustration of the unsuitability of the present
Maryland code as a drafting model can be found in the
burglary and breaking and entering field, where the dis-
tinctions are ridiculous and the draftsmanship is appall-
ing.5 3
The following offenses are separately set forth:
1. Common law burglary (not defined in the statute):
roughly, breaking and entering the dwelling house of an-
other at night with intent to commit a felony (usually
therein). A provision is added in a separate section to
assure that an intent to commit petty larceny suffices as
felonious intent for common law burglary. 4
2. Breaking a dwelling house in the daytime with
felonious intent (including intent to steal)."
3. Breaking a stated class of buildings - "storehouse,
filling station, garage, trailer, cabin, diner, warehouse, or
other outhouse" - with felonious intent (including intent
noted in 18 Md. L. Rev. 237 (1958). The distinction between larceny after
trust and embezzlement is suggested, if not made entirely clear, by the
language of the sections, and at first glance appears to be supported by
the Reporter's headnote to the official report (at 299) to the Nolan case,
although the opinion itself is silent on the point. Since the Reporter
speaks of the "common law crime of larceny after trust" ("larceny after
trust" did not exist as a common law crime) and the Court is speaking
of common law "larceny" in situations of trust, presumably the Reporter
did not intend to refer to the purely statutory crime of "larceny after
trust."
"An effective consolidation of the central theft offenses, to avoid some
pointless distinctions, is a prime need. Maryland has effected a very
limited consolidation in permitting conviction of false pretenses upon
proof of larceny or robbery (Q 140). Many jurisdictions have found a
more complete solution. The Model Penal Code (Prop. Off. Draft 1962)
8 223.1 treats the question.5 'This muddle was explored in Moylan, Maryland Law of Burglary and
Breaking and Entering, Daily Record, March 14, 1960, p. 3. The situation
was even worse then than it is now.
8 §§ 29, 30. Section 30, providing that an intent to "steal, take or carry
away" suffices for burglary (1) is probably unnecessary, since at common
law intent to steal goods of any value provided sufficient burglarious intent
(see PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (1957) 167) ; and (2) is in danger of being
construed to require something less than an intent to commit larceny,
e.g., intent to borrow. On the face of §§ 29 and 30 it is even possible to
argue that the latter section defines an offense for which the former
merely provides the punishment, thereby abolishing all forms of burglary
in which there is an intent to commit some felony other than larceny.
55 § 32. This is subject to the construction danger numbered (2) in note
54, supra.
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to steal only if the value of the property sought is $100 or
more).56
4. Breaking a second class of buildings - "shop, store-
house, tobacco house, warehouse, or other building, al-
though the same be not contiguous to or used with any
mansion house" - with intent to steal property worth less
than $100.17
5. Breaking the same second class of buildings and
actually stealing property worth less than $5.55
6. Breaking a third class of buildings - "Shop, store-
room, filling station, garage, trailer, cabin, diner, tobacco
house or warehouse, although the same be not contiguous
to or used with any mansion house" - and actually
stealing property worth $5 or more."9
7. Breaking and entering a building and opening or
attempting to open a vault, safe or other secure place by
explosives."0
Intriguing construction problems arise. It can be argued,
for example, that one who breaks a tobacco house, in-
tending to steal property worth $100 or more, but actually
taking nothing, is guilty of no offense under the statutes,
while if his intention had been to take less than $100 worth
of property, he would have been subject to 18 months im-
prisonment.
Because of its failure to give explicit definition to many
important offenses, the Maryland code is subject to a
special kind of difficulty, nicely illustrated by a recent
development in the conspiracy statute. Prior to 1961 the
general conspiracy section of the Maryland code read:"'
"Every person convicted of the crime of conspiracy
shall be liable to be punished by a fine not exceeding
§ 32. This is also subject to the construction danger numbered (2) in
note 54, supra.§ 342. This section is found in the larceny part of the code, although
logically it belongs with the breaking offenses. It has been in its orphaned
state since MD. LAws 1809, Ch. 138, when its predecessor, subsection 6
(6), was combined with the petty larceny provision.
There is an orphaned murder offense in the present code as well, classi-
fied under "Railroads" 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 454.§ 342.§ 33.
e §§ 34, 35. Out of mercy for the reader, I suppress reference to other
perephrial statutes relating to burglary, e.g., 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27,§ 114 (breaking or entering railroad car with intent to steal).
6'3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 38. (The amendment was accomplished
by MD. LAws 1961, Ch. 691).
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two thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the jail or
the Maryland House of Correction or the Maryland
Penitentiary, for not more than ten years, or both,
in the discretion of the court; provided that all actions
or prosecutions hereunder shall be commenced within
two years after the commission of said offense."
It has been amended to read:
"The punishment of every person convicted of the
crime of conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for the offense he or she con-
spired to commit."
On its face, the amendment accomplishes two things: it
abolishes the special statute of limitations for conspiracy,
and it changes the punishment from a fixed term of im-
prisonment or fine or both to a sentence like the one pro-
vided for the particular crime which is the subject of the
conspiracy. The casual reader would suppose that it does
nothing more. However, the amendment probably abol-
ishes a large portion of the law of conspiracy. At com-
mon law the object of a conspiracy need not be a crime;
certain other unlawful or immoral acts are enough.2 By
implication of the amendment, conspiracies having such
objects appear to be abolished. Perhaps they should be.
But the failure to define conspiracies in the statute per-
mits such a change in the law to be made without its
becoming apparent on the face of the language of the
statute, and perhaps even to be made inadvertently.
Enough has been shown to demonstrate that the present
Maryland statutes make a poor drafting model. They do
not form a well thought out, coherent product, and the
State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 351-352 (1821), lists the following
conspiracies for which indictments will lie at common law (other than
those having common law criminal objects) :
"1st. For a conspiracy to do an act not illegal, nor punishable if done
by an individual, but immoral only.... 2d. For a conspiracy to do an
act neither illegal nor immoral in an individual, but to effect a
purpose, which has a tendency to prejudice the public. . . .3d. For a
conspiracy to extort money from another, or to injure his reputation
by means not indictable if practiced by an individual, as by verbal
defamation, and that, whether it be to charge him with an indictable
offense or not .... 4th. For a conspiracy to cheat and defraud a third
person, accomplished by means of an act which would not in law
amount to an indictable cheat, if effected 'by an individual. ...
5th. For a malicious conspiracy, to impoverish or ruin a third person
in his trade or profession .... 6th. For a conspiracy to defraud a third
person by means of an act not per 8e unlawful, and though no person
be thereby injured. . . . 7th. For a bare conspiracy to cheat or de-
fraud a third person, though the means of effecting it should not
be determined on at the time. .. ."
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product they do form has not really been tested by long
time practice and judicial scrutiny, because of the small
role of the courts in substantive criminal law prior to
1950.
Fortunately, there are several recent codes which would
make good models. The states of Illinois, 3 Wisconsin,6' and
Louisiana65 have enacted carefully considered codes. The
most ambitious project has been that of the American
Law Institute. Its well-annotated Model Penal Code is
approaching completion as this is written.6 One of these
codes would give Maryland its best starting point. Prob-
ably the most satisfactory of all of them would be the
Model Penal Code, which represents the careful thought
of many of the outstanding judges, lawyers, and teachers
from Maryland and other parts of the country.
It might be supposed that the best result could be
obtained by choosing, for each Maryland provision, the
most likely looking code source which can be found in the
various code systems. This approach was adopted by the
Maryland Self-Survey Commission's proposed criminal
code." With all respect to the diligent and able laborers
who produced this code, their method, under the limita-
tions of time and expense imposed on the draftsmen, has
brought about an unsatisfactory result. Multiplicity of
drafting sources has produced an ill-matched assortment
of provisions. It is difficult enough to produce an in-
ternally consistent code under even the best drafting pro-
cedures. A "cut and paste" procedure magnifies the danger.
Perhaps a single illustration will show the kind of draw-
back which is most serious in the proposed code. Its
§ 7(d) (1) provides:
"ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961, effective Jan. 1, 1962 (SMITH-HuED
ILL. ANN. STAT., Ch. 38). The TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED
ILLINOIS REVISED CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961, prepared by the Illinois State
and Chicago Bar Associations' Joint Committee to Revise the Illinois
Criminal Code, in 1960, contains valuable notes.
6441 WEST'S WISC. STATS. ANN. (1958) Tit. XLV, adopted in 1955.
See also the draft code with notes in Volume V of the Wisconsin Legis-
lative Council's Judiciary Committee REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE
(1953).
9 WEST's LA. ISTATS. ANN. (REv. STAT. 1950) Tit. 14, adopted in 1942.6 4The text of the code will be found in the Proposed Official Draft (1962).
This draft contains references to more extensive comments on the sections
in the thirteen tentative drafts, published from 1953 to 1961, and to
Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (1961), on sentencing and correction.
07 "This proposed Code has been modeled upon (a) the Wisconsin
Criminal Code, adopted in 1955; (b) the Louisiana Criminal Code, adopted
in 1942; (c) the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute and
(d) Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. The latter has been
followed in all cases where it is equally as good or is better than the
others." STATE OF MARYLAND, FOURTH AND FINAL REPORT OF MARYLAND
SELF-SURVEY COMMISSION, RELATING TO PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE 2 (1960).
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"When criminal intent is an element of a crime in
the criminal code, such intent is indicated by the term
'intentionally', the phrase 'with intent to', the phrase
'with intent that', or some form of the verbs 'know' or
'believe'."
This section is derived from the Wisconsin Code.68 The
proposed Maryland code's kidnapping provision (§ 21) was
taken from other sources.6 9 It reads:
"Whoever transports, from one place to another,
confines or conceals, any person who had been unlaw-
fully, by force or by threats of imminent force, or by
fraud or deceit, or, while he is unconscious, or under
the influence of alcohol or drugs, seized, confined,
inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, concealed,
detained or carried away and held, whether for ran-
som, reward or otherwise, except in the case of a
minor by a parent thereof, shall be guilty of a
felony ......
Are we to assume that criminal intent is not to be an ele-
ment of kidnapping, and that the man who drives off in
his automobile, not knowing that a kidnap victim has been
hidden in his trunk, is to be convicted?7"
If we take a single, carefully drawn code for a starting
point, and make departures from it only where they can
be plainly justified, carefully blending in changes with
other portions of the code, a coherent result, satisfying
special Maryland needs, can be attained.
Not only consistency in form and language, but con-
sistency in treatment can be achieved by taking a single
good source as a draft. Sentencing provisions will become
more uniform. Interpretation for the bench and bar may
be simpler under a well-annotated product like the Model
Penal Code than under the still largely unexplored jungle
of the present Article 27, with its great reliance on the
6141 WEST'S WISC. STATS. ANN. (1958) § 939.23 (1).
6The draftsmen give as sources 18 U.S.C. (1950) § 1201 (a), 3 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 337, and 41 WEST'S WISC. STATS. ANN. (1958)
§ 940.31. STATE OF MARYLAND, op. cit. supra, n. 67, 203. The Wisconsin
provision carefully specifies the necessary intent.
o This intent problem is endemic in the Self-Survey Commission's pro-
posed code. The proposed code appears to make one who accidentally sets
fire to the building of another without consent guilty of the code equiva-
lent of arson, one who absent-mindedly drives off in somebody else's car
without consent punishable by four years imprisonment, and an uncon-
scious rape victim guilty of adultery or fornication. STATE OF MARYLAND,
op. cit. supra, n. 67, §§ 43, 55 and 75, respectively. There may be other
instances of failure to provide explicitly for intent.
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common law for definition. The drafting process can be
relatively simple and quick. Principal attention can be
focused on resolving a few important questions of policy
rather than on minor details of composition.
A NEW CRIMINAL CODE: SOME OBJECTIONS ExAmVmNED
The potential benefit of a new code is obvious. Ob-
jections exist, however, and they need to be examined.
Four of the principal objections are here considered.
1. Maryland has got along all right with its system of
common law and fragmentary legislation for many years;
why change? This objection has two weaknesses. First,
Maryland criminal law has been nowhere close to ideal
in its operation. Its weaknesses have been obscured to
some extent by the tradition of trial of criminal cases
without juries, because a succession of able trial judges
has been able to mitigate them. A competent bench and
bar, dedicated to fair administration of justice, can go a
long way towards making even the worst system work
passably. Maryland's system of substantive criminal law
is probably closer to the worst than the best of those
within the common law tradition. A combination of the
vagueness of much common law definition, the unsys-
tematic nature of our statutory law, and the lack (until
recently) of judicial analysis in the field could hardly be
expected to produce a model system.
Second, the fundamental procedural change inaugu-
rated in 1950 by the amendment of Article XV, section 5,
of the Maryland Constitution, to take the question of suffi-
ciency of the evidence from the exclusive province of the
jury, makes more pressing the need for substantive reform.
As more and more of the provisions of our present common
and statutory law come before the Court of Appeals for re-
view, the inadequacies will become more obvious and more
painful.
Our criminal law is in such a state of disorganization
now that it would put an impossible strain on piecemeal
legislative and ordinary judicial processes to expect them
to work it pure in the forseeable future. We need a sub-
stantially new code as a good beginning on which the
routine methods can work. The necessary systematic cor-
rection and improvement can only then be expected to
take place in the legislature and courts.
2. Why abandon the heritage of our common law
crimes, developed through centuries of practical, trial and
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error judicial development, and, especially, why abandon
the common law tradition which has given us this remark-
able body of law? This objection requires a rather full
answer. It might be supposed from the foregoing criticisms
of the Maryland criminal law that the writer is con-
temptuous of the achievements of the common law. This
is false, but the writer does believe that a romantic haze
surrounds the concept of common law growth and needs to
be dispelled.
When we try to form a mental picture of common law
development, the stage setting for our thoughts is apt to
be Old Bailey, or some vaguely imagined precursor. The
dramatis personae includes a few star parts, like Lord
Coke's, and features justices in eyre, sergeants at law, and
country justices of the peace at quarter sessions. All are
charmingly costumed and stand around arguing nice points
of law. Perhaps some reporter takes down the words
(more or less in the form they are uttered) of the learned
judge as he recalls some oral precedent. Later and greater
judges recast and order his thoughts as the necessities of
new cases require. Eminent text writers attempt more
general formulations. The whole thing grows beautifully,
like a mediaeval cathedral; gradually, almost impercepti-
bly, the structure matures and improves. Who would
destroy this ancient, this beautiful, this glorious monu-
ment? Motherhood would probably be the next target.
Now, in the first place, this leaves out of account the
bell tower that collapsed, some rather inferior decoration
in the north transept, and the general prevalence of drafts.
Despite its great and undoubted accomplishments, the
common law had its share of errors and lapses; these had
to be corrected, when corrected at all, by legislation. From
the earliest times, traditional common law development
was supplemented by legislative action. Almost any of
the major crimes generally thought of as of common law
origin have a surprising number of statutes contributing
to their history.
Stephen7 lists most of the important ones. Between
the leges Henrici Primi,72 dating from about 1100-1135,
and the first statute consolidating the homicide offenses in
13 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883). The
homicide statutes are discussed at 1-107 (particularly at 34-79), statutes
dealing with assault and related offenses at 108-120, and statutes relating
to theft offenses at 121-176. Other offenses are treated in subsequent
pages.
"This was an unofficial compilation of laws in force in the time of
Henry I. There were earlier statutes and codes. 'See 1 id. 51-53.
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1861, 73 he discusses nineteen British statutory provisions
relating to homicide,74 and many more dealing with as-
saults and the like.75 The theft field (here including for
convenience robbery, burglary and extortion along with
the more peaceful theft crimes) is so crowded with legis-
lation that, in connection with the Theft Consolidation Act
of 182776 and related legislation, it was necessary to repeal
more than 135 statutes, at least 68 of which related directly
to theft itself.77
These statistics are not intended to establish that most
of the major development of the criminal law has been
statutory; in most fields it has not been. Although some
major changes have been made by statute, most enact-
ments have tended to deal with punishments or to extend
the scope of common law ideas to new fields, much as
"24 & 25 Vict., c. 100 (1861).
'4These are 52 Hen. 3, c. 25 (1267) (abolishing fine on township in
certain classes of homicide) ; 6 Edw. 1, c. 9 (1278) (introducing special
verdict for self-defense and misadventure, and providing for pardons in
such cases); 21 Edw. 1, st. 2 (1293) (protecting from prosecution
forresters killing without malice in making certain arrests) ; 14 Edw. 3,
st. 1, c. 4 (1340) (,ablolishing presentment of Englishry, earlier required
!to avoid payment of the murdrum, a special fine against the community
levied for killing a Norman, as opposed to an Englishman); 25 Edw. 3,
st. 5, c. 2 (1350) (defining petty treasons) ; 13 Rich. 2, st. 2, c. 1 (1389)
(providing material toward a definition of murder) ; 16 Rich. 2, c. 6
(1392) (repealing penalties imposed by the previous act for soliciting
pardons in specified homicide cases) ; 12 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1496) (making
petty treason non-clergiable) ; 4 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1512) (making murder
in churches or on highways non-clergiable); 22 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1530)
(making willful murder by poison high treason and therefore non-
clergiable) ; 23 Hen. 8, c. 1, §§ 3, 4 (1531) (making willful, malicious
murder non-clergiable) ; 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1532) (abolishing forfeiture of
goods for killing a thief in self-defense) ; 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, § 10 (1547)
(making ,all murder non-clergiable) ; 2 Jac. 1, c. 8 (1604) (making killing
by stabbing, when the victim had not drawn his weapon, non-clergiable) ;
3 Geo. 4, c. 38 (1822) (providing punishment of transportation, imprison-
ment, or fine for manslaughter) ; 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 27 (1827) (repealing
21 Edw. 1, st. 2 (1293), 8upra, this note) ; 9 Geo. 4, 31, § 2 (1828) (absorbing
petty treason into murder) ; 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10 (1828) (abolishing
forfeiture of goods for killing by misfortune, in self-defense, or in any
other manner without felony) ; 9 & 10 Vict., c. 62 (1846) (abolishing
florfeiture of chattels occasioning homicide (deodands)).
"I Stephen cites as illustrative eight statutes dealing with specialized
kinds of assaults prior to 43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803), the first general assault
statute. 3 STEPHEN, op. cit. 8upra, n. 71, 109-113. A number of other
related statutes are also treated.
717 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29 (1827).
"7The repealing act, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 27 (1827), also repealed certain
acts relating to benefit of clergy, malicious injury to property, and
remedies against the hundred, and it is not always possible to be sure
from the titles which of the acts relate to 'theft. The 68 acts clearly
dealing with theft do not include all acts repealed prior to 1827; e.g.,
an act of 23 Geo. 2, c. 26 (1750), dealing in part with turnip theft (§ 13) ;
is not counted because it was repealed by 13 Geo. 3, c. 32 (1773), an act
"for the more effectually preventing the stealing or destroying of turnips,
potatoes, cabbages, parsnips, pease, and carrots."
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Maryland legislation has been shown to do. The point is
rather that the development of the criminal law has by
no means been a purely judicial one at any period of its
history, and that there has been constant need for legis-
lative action. And of course in recent times there has
been a movement towards statutory consolidation in vari-
ous fields of criminal law and towards the production of
unified criminal codes.
If a partial answer to those who deplore departure
from the common law tradition is that legislation has
always played a role in the development of the criminal
law, perhaps a better answer is that the central ideas of
the common law will necessarily be reflected in any
modern code that Maryland might adopt. Under any code,
judges would continue to contribute to the growth of the
law through interpretation. Furthermore, the substantive
provisions of a new code would necessarily bear the marks
of its history. Concepts developed at common law form
the basis of modern codes.7s Of course the modern codes
make noticeable and important changes in previous com-
mon law and statute, but the underlying ideas are for the
most part familiar to the common lawyer. The heritage of
previous law is not lost.
To illustrate this, consider the action of the Model
Penal Code on the common law crime of murder and the
statutory crime of receiving stolen goods. The Model
Penal Code's treatment of murder can be seen from the
following sections: 79
"§ 210.1 Criminal Homicide.
(1) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently 0
causes the death of another human being.
78 Indeed, in the major crimes, the definitions in the major mature legal
systems in the world have much in common, simply because of the
similar demands of civilized life over the globe. See infra notes 92 and
99 for a comparison of French and German provisions with current
American law.
9 Sections are taken from, and unless otherwise noted, citations are to
the Proposed Official Draft (1962), which gives reference to earlier
formulations and to commentaries. No isolated provision of the code can
be fully understood without reference to related matters: in the case
'of homicide, e.g., to the treatment of such topics as self-defense and
other justifications (Art. 3), and insanity and other provisions limiting
responsibility (Art. 4). However, it is hoped that enough is given here
ito illustrate underlying common law concepts in a modern code.
8o Section 2.02 defines "purposely" (having death as a conscious object),
"knowingly" (being aware that conduct is practically certain to cause
death), "recklessly" (consciously disregarding a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk of death), and "negligently" (unconsciously disregarding a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of which the actor should be aware).
The definitions suggested here are approximate only.
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§ 210.2 Murder.
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3 (1) (b),"
criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life. Such recklessness and indif-
ference are presumed if the actor is engaged or
is an accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate
sexual intercourse by force or threat of force,
arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape."
Section 210.2 (1) (a) corresponds to that class of com-
mon law murder in which, without justification, excuse or
mitigating circumstances (similar to those provided for
in the Model Penal Code), the actor intends to kill or
cause great bodily harm. 2 The provision is slightly nar-
rower than the common law; it does not include cases in
which the actor intends great bodily harm but not death,
and is unaware that his conduct is practically certain to
cause death. However, subsection (1) (b) would make
murder those killings within that class in which the actor's
conduct is "committed recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life." Only cases in which the trier of fact found that the
actor intended serious bodily harm (but not death) and
caused death by conduct showing less than a reckless,
extreme indifference to life, would no longer be murder.
Such cases hardly represent a significant departure from
common law theory.
The cases in subsection (1) (b) in which the killing is
committed recklessly, under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life, would also
include the common law "depraved heart" doctrine, mak-
ing defendants like those who play a form of Russian
Roulette, in which the defendant "hopes" that the bullet
is not in firing position as he aims at the victim's head,
guilty of murder.83 The Model Penal Code eliminates a
e Section 210.3 (1) (b) deals with provocation, which reduces what
would otherwise be murder to manslaughter.
8 This class of common law murders is identified in PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW (1957) 31-32.
8 Id., 32. Some of the cases are discussed in a comment to the earlier
form of the Model Penal Code section (then § 201.2) in Tentative Draft
No. 9 (1959) at 29-30. The Russian Roulette example is suggested by
Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 47 A. 2d 445 (1946).
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class of cases whose status was in doubt at common law,
in that it plainly requires that the defendant - and not
merely some reasonable man in his position - actually
be aware of the risk. There is some authority, much
criticized, to the effect that if a reasonable man would
recognize that his conduct would cause great bodily harm
or death, it is murder when death results, even if the
particular defendant, less perceptive than most, did not
realize this.14 A separate offense of negligent homicide,s"
a lesser crime than manslaughter (which requires ad-
vertence), s6 is provided in the Model Penal Code. Negli-
gent homicide ordinarily carries a maximum penal sen-
tence of five years, as opposed to ten years for man-
slaughter, and death or life imprisonment for murder.8 7
Felony-murders, the third great class of common law
murders, are abolished as such by the Model Penal Code.
But they reappear in the form of a presumption of reck-
lessness and extreme indifference to life (and therefore
murder) in killings by the defendant in the course of
specified crimes, quite similar to those familiar to Mary-
land lawyers. The unlimited form of the common law
felony-murder rule, by which any death caused by the
actor in the course of a felony is murder, is now rarely
applied and is not easily justified. Commonly, the rule is
applied only to some felonies (e.g., those naturally dan-
gerous to life), the causal requirement is tightened, or
some other limitation is imposed. The interest of the
public seems adequately protected by leaving it to the
defendant to advance proof that something less than the
extreme recklessness described in the Model Penal Code
caused death.88
"Regina v. Ward, [1956] 1 Q.B. 351 (C.C.A.), so holds. The tort or
objective view of criminal liability followed in this case is criticized in
HATL, GENERAL PR NcIPLEs OF CRIMINAL LAw, ch. V (2d ed. 1960).
The Model Penal Code accepts objective criminal liability in some situa-
tions, but not here. In discussing the criminal liability sometimes im-
posed in the code for mere negligence (where it is enough that the
defendant should be aware of risk, even if in fact he is not), it is
stated that negligence "should not generally be deemed sufficient in
the definition of specific crimes," but that to some extent, knowledge that
punishment may follow inadvertance may encourage care, and therefore
that limited use of punishment for negligence is justified. Model Penal




Note that "when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is
submitted to the jury, the Court shall charge that while the presumed fact
must, on all the evidence, be proved beylond a reasonable doubt, the law
declares that the jury may regard the facts giving rise to the presumption
as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact." § 1.12 (5) (b). Thus, even
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One familiar concept abandoned by the Code is that
of degrees of murder. Unknown at common law, first
degree murder was invented to reduce the incidence of
the death penalty theretofore applicable to all common
law murder. The usual requirements for murder in the
first degree in cases involving intentional physical harm
are premeditation, deliberation and a specific intent to
kill. (Killings in the course of certain serious crimes are
commonly also made first degree murder.) In intentional
killings many courts have so watered down the require-
ments of premeditation and deliberation as to leave them
almost meaningless. s9 Also, the distinction can separate
sheep from goats only very roughly. The mercy killer is
a first degree murderer while the impulsive killer, even if
acting on the slightest of provocations or no provocation
at all, is found guilty of only second degree murder. The
division of murder into degrees is usually condemned, or
supported only because it is thought that no better device
can be found to limit the death penalty.90 Instead of
dividing murder into degrees, the Model Penal Code pro-
vides, for jurisdictions where the death penalty is retained,
a catalogue of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
used as a guide for the court or jury in determining sen-
tence.91
if the defendant introduced evidence suggesting accident and the prose-
cution introduced nothing which would directly rebut the suggestion, the
jury could convict if it disbelieved the defendant's claim.
A survey of the current status of the felony-murder rule and an ex-
planation of the reasons for the code treatment will be found in Model
Penal Code (Tent. Draft. No. 9, 1959) § 201.2, comment at 33-39.
',See casenote, Deliberation and Premeditation in Fir8t Degree Murder,
21 Md. L. Rev. 349 (1961).
0 A classic attack on the premeditation and deliberation test is found in
CARDOZO, LAW AND LiTER TuRE (1931) 95-101. The REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1949-1953), Cmd. No. 8932, pars.
485-534, carefully discusses the rationale of dividing murder into degrees,
proposed tests, and the history of the operation of the division in the
United States, and reaches a decision rejecting the division.
91 § 210.6. Murders involving aggravating circumstances include multiple
murders or murders causing great risk of death to many persons, murders
in the course of specified crimes, murders for pecuniary gain, murders
by convicts under sentence of imprisonment or by persons seeking to
avoid arrest or effect escape, and murders manifesting exceptional de-
pravity. Mitigating circumstances in murder include lack of history of
prior significant criminal activity, the participation or consent of the
victim, the defendant's belief in moral justification for his act, domination
of a defendant whose participation was relatively minor by another, the
defendant's action being under the influence of extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance or certain kinds of impaired mental capacity less than
insanity, and the defendant's youth. If the court finds either no aggra-
vating circumstances or the presence of substantial mitigating circum-
stances (or certain other circumstances exist), this eliminates the death
penalty. Otherwise a separate proceeding, in which the rules of evidence
are relaxed, is held to afford the prosecution and defense an opportunity
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In summary, the action of the Model Penal Code on
the common law offense of murder is by no means to
abandon the teachings of the common law. In inten-
tional killings, the formulation is slightly narrower but
quite close to the common law provision, and it does not
employ concepts which are particularly unfamiliar and
difficult for a common lawyer. In extremely reckless
killings, the Code provision could stand as a reformulation
of the common law, except that in one doubtful case an
act which might be common law murder has been made
negligent homicide. It abandons the felony-murder rule
in order to achieve a fairer result, but it retains the
unsympathetic attitude of the common law to killings in
the course of dangerous crimes, by the device of a pre-
sumption of extreme recklessness in the former felony-
murder area. This retention of common law building
blocks while choosing among competing theories and
clarifying and improving the arrangement and formulation
of ideas is typical. 92
A second illustration will show the action of the Model
Penal Code on a familiar crime of statutory origin, re-
ceiving stolen goods. 3 In the course of consolidating the
to explore the defendant's background and to show the presence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the final imposition of the
death sentence being in the discretion of the court, or court and jury.
'Even non-common law formulations show similarity to American Law.
Cf. The French and German penal codes. Some of the FRENCH PENAL
CODE provisions are:
"Willful homicide is murder. (Art. 295) Every murder committed
with premeditation or by lying in wait is an assassination. (Art. 296)
Premeditation consist of an aforethought decision to make a homicidal
attack on a certain person or anyone encountered, regardless of any
circumstances or conditions on which the act may be dependent. (Art.
297) Lying in wait consists of waiting for whatever length of time
in one or several places for a person either to kill, or inflict violence
upon, him. (Art. 298) Any person guilty of assassination .. . shall
be punished by death.... (Art. 302) Murder, preceded, accompanied
or followed by another felony, shall be punished by death. ... (Art.
304)". 1 AmERicAN SRIES OF FOnREG NPENA CODES (Mueller ed. 1960)
104, 105, The GERMAN PENAL CODE provides (§ 211) : "1. Murder shall
be punished by confinement in a penitentiary for life. 2. Anybody who
kills a human being out of murderous lust, or to satisfy a sexual
urge, or out of greed or from other base motives, maliciously or
cruelly, or by means of endangering the public, or in order to commit
or cover up another punishable act, is a murderer." 4 id., 113 (1961).
3Despite some possibly misleading language in State v. Hodges, 55
Md. 127, 137 (1880), and Henze v. State, 154 Md. 332, 335, 140 A. 218(1928), receiving was not punishable as a separate crime at common law.
In early times the receiver might be prosecuted for misprision of felony
or compounding a felony. Later, by statute (3 W. & M., c. 9, § 4 (1961)),
he was punishable as an accessory after the fact to larceny. Finally,
receiving became a separate statutory offense (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, § 54
(1827)). See CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRI1ES (6th ed. 1958) 856-
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theft offenses, the Code makes receiving theft, and de-
scribes it as follows:
"§ 223.6. Receiving Stolen Property
(1) Receiving. A person is guilty of theft if he
purposely94 receives, retains, or disposes of movable
property of another knowing that it has been stolen,
or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless
the property is received, retained, or disposed with
purpose to restore it to the owner. 'Receiving' means
acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the
security of the property.
(2) Presumption of Knowledge. The requisite
knowledge or belief is presumed in the case of a
dealer who:
(a) is found in possession or control of prop-
erty stolen from two or more persons on separate
occasions; or
(b) has received stolen property in another
transaction within the year preceding the trans-
action charged; or
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort re-
ceived, acquires it for a consideration which he
knows is far below its reasonable value.
'Dealer' means a person in the business of buying
or selling goods."
Theft offenses, including receiving, are graded.95
Comparison of this draft with the present Maryland
provision will show the similarity of concepts and treat-
ment; the Maryland statute grades the offense according
to whether or not the stolen property is worth less than
$100, and defines it as: 96
"receiving any stolen money, goods, or chattels . . .
knowing the same to be stolen, or .. .receiving any
857; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (1957) 274. This is recognized locally in
HoCIiHNEIMEB, LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1904) 461.
"This word was added in Model Penal Code, Changes and, Editorial
Corrections, in the May 4, 1962, Proposed Official Draft (July 30, 1962) at
3. The definition of "dealer" is to be expanded to include pawnbrokers.
95§ 223.1 (2). In the highest grade the amount involved exceeds $500,
or the property involved is a firearm, automobile, or other motor-propelled
vehicle, or the receiver is in the business of buying or selling stolen
property. There is another dividing line at the $50 level.
9e3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 466, and 3 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962)
Art. 27, § 467.
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bond, bill obligatory, bill of exchange, promissory note
for the payment of money, bank note, paper bill of
credit, or certificate granted by or under the authority
of this State, or the United States, or any of them.
knowing the same to be stolen....
A recent Maryland case, reviewing authorities, summarizes
the crime as follows:9s
"In order to constitute the offense of receiving
stolen goods four elements are necessary: (1) the
property must be received; (2) it must, at the time of
its receipt, be stolen property; (3) the receiver must
have guilty knowledge that it is stolen property; and
(4) his intent in receiving it must be fraudulent."
Again, the Maryland and Model Penal Code rules are
similar in fundamentals.99
What would be lost in transition to the Model Penal
Code thus would not be the valuable part of the common
law-statutory tradition. Underlying ideas are the same.
Changes are almost always for the better. They are largely
improvements consisting of abolition of obsolete accre-
tions, attainment of clearer and more unified formulation,
and incorporation of promising new ideas.
One important portion of the objection to abolition of
the common law remains to be considered. Modern codes
define each crime; they commonly provide that nothing
shall be a crime unless explicitly made such by the code
w Note that the Model Penal Code provision quoted supra in the text
accompanying notes 93 and 94 (§ 223.6) uses the term "movable property"
in place of the cumbersome list in the Maryland statute. This is defined as
"property the locatin of which can be changed, including things growing
on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents although the rights repre-
sented thereby have no physical location." "Property" is defined as "any-
thing of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal
property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or claims
'to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic ani-
mals, food and drink, electric or other power." § 223.0 (4) and (6).
I Weddle v. State, 228 Md. 98, 102, 178 A. 2d 882 (1962).
91 Cf. crimes similar to receiving in non-common law jurisdictions. Art.
460 of the FRENCH PENAL CODE states, "Any person knowingly receiving,
totally or partially, good [sic] stolen, misappropriated or obtained through
any felony or misdemeanor, shall be subject to . . . punishments .. "
1 AmERItcAN SERIEs OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (Mueller ed. 1960) 150.
The GERMAN PENAL CODE provides in Art. 259, "1. Anybody who for gain
conceals, purchases, accepts or pledges or otherwise acquires property of
which he knows or under the circumstances should know that they have
been acquired by means of a punishable act, or who participates in the
disposal of such goods, shall be punished by imprisonment as a receiver of
stolen property .... " 4 id., 133 (1961).
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or some other statutory provision."' 0 This means that the
capacity of the common law to expand, without need of
legislation, to meet new situations is limited to rather
minor, interstitial matters. It may be feared that the code
will turn out to be incomplete - overlooking some old
offense, or failing to anticipate some new form of evil -
and that wrongdoers will go unpunished under the code,
while they might have been dealt with under the common
law. To judge the weight of this objection it is necessary
to know what this expansion power of the common law
actually amounts to, first in the case of extending by
analogy old offenses to meet new situations, and second
in the case of creation of new offenses - or perhaps
theorists would prefer "newly discovered offenses."
The nature of borderline expansion of a common law
offense is quite complex. The extent to which the common
law would expand was unpredictable. Common law lar-
ceny, for example, expanded in some ways by case to case
analogy, e.g., by employment of the fiction of custody in
certain cases of theft by servants. However, the judges
refused to expand it in other ways; to cover embezzlements,
and thefts of some animals, legislation was required.
Reasons for expansion in some areas and lack of expansion
in others appear to rest largely on historical accident
rather than common sense. The complicated borderline
between common law larceny and its related statutory
offenses is a product of this eccentric development; very
little making sense in terms of modern policy can be found
in the placement of this line. It would seem that by now
the criminal law has reached a stage of development which
permits us to see approximately where rather stable lines
between innocence and guilt can be drawn in most of-
fenses. These can best be drawn by statute. Lawful con-
duct can be determined with closer precision than at
common law if the statute is carefully drafted. Minor
adjustments can be handled by further legislation. The
tendency of modern statutes to speak in terms of general
classes of things, as opposed to the old statutory tendency
to change by adding only the narrowest of classes of things,
one at a time, reduces the need for constant tinkering and
expansion."'
'10E.g., Model Penal Code (Prop. Off. Draft 1962) § 1.05 (1).
101 Compare the Maryland statutory enumeration of things subject to
theft (3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27 as amended in 1962 Cum. Supp.)
§§ 340-352 with the general classification in a mlodern code (e.g., Model
Penal Code (Prop. Off. Draft 1962) § 223.0 (4) and (6), set out supra,
n. 97).
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As far as the supposed power of the common law to de-
clare new offenses is concerned, the case was well put by
Mr. Justice Stephen about eighty years ago:" 2
"Though the existence of this power [to declare
acts to be offenses at common law, although no such
declaration was ever made before] as inherent in the
judges has been asserted by several high authorities
for a great length of time, it is hardly probable that
any attempt would be made to exercise it as the
present day; and any such attempt would be received
with great opposition, and would put the bench in
an invidious position....
"In times when legislation was scanty, the powers
referred to were necessary. That the law in its
earlier stages should be developed by judicial deci-
sions from a few vague generalities was natural and
inevitable. But a new state of things has come into
existence. On the one hand, the courts have done
their work; they have developed the law. On the
other hand, parliament is regular in its sittings and
active in its labours; and if the protection of society
requires the enactment of additional penal laws,
parliament will soon supply them. If parliament is
not disposed to provide punishments for acts which
are upon any ground objectionable or dangerous, the
presumption is that they belong to that class of mis-
conduct which it is not desirable to punish. Besides,
there is every reason to believe that the criminal
law is, and for a considerable time has been, suffi-
ciently developed to provide all the protection for
the public peace and for the property and persons of
individuals which they are likely to require under
almost any circumstances which can be imagined; and
this is an additional reason why its further develop-
ment ought to be left in the hands of parliament."
If Stephen was somewhat optimistic about the lack
of new offenses to be expected, on the whole this sum-
mary and prediction has proved accurate. There are a
few instances of the exercise of this judicial power to
find new offenses, but the instances are very rare. The
decisions recognizing the new offenses seem unnecessary;
the offenses are trivial, no emergency is involved; in short
no good reason appears why they could not await legis-
13 STEPHEN, Op. Cit. supra, n. 71, 359-360.
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lative consideration and avoid the appearance of retro-
active criminal law.103
Some, while willing to abolish all but explicitly stated
offenses, do object to the abolishing of all but explicitly
stated defenses, on the ground that some obscure defense,
existing or discoverable at common law, might be over-
looked, and a defendant thereby improperly convicted.
The belief of such objectors is that while the state can
afford this kind of very slight risk in the case of offenses,
the defendant should not be required to take it in the
case of defenses. °4 The Model Penal Code relies on elabo-
rate explicit formulation of defenses. A rather general
justification provision, however, may go a long way to-
wards resolution of this aspect of the problem.105
So, what is lost by the abolition of the common law of
crimes is a rather vague and doubtful capacity for
10 A typical case is The King v. Manley [1933] 1 K.B. 529 (C.C.A.
1932), in which the knowing making of a false report to the police was
found to be a common law misdemeanor, despite the lack of specific
precedent. The Manley case has been much criticized; its reasoning was
questioned in Regina v. Newland [1954] 1 Q.B. 158 (C.C.A. 1953). In
1957 Maryland followed a sounder course by covering the Manley offense
by statute. 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 150. An inferior Pennsylvania
Court, one judge dissenting, has recently found that making obscene phone
calls is a common law misdemeanor, at least in Pennsylvania. Common-
wealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A. 2d 788 (1955). The Model
Penal Code (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) § 1.05, comment at 107, says:
"Indeed, in England it seems fairly clear that notwithstanding Rem
v. Manley . . . the common law power would not now be exercised
to declare conduct a misdemeanor, unless its criminality has been
established by clear precedent.... We should be even firmer in this
view in the United States. A statute declaring conduct contra bonos
mores to be criminal would hardly satisfy constitutional requirements
of specificity. . . . The concept has no greater merit when it rests
upon the common law."
104This viewpoint is reflected in the Wisdonsin Code, 41 WEsT's Wisc.
STATS. ANN. (1958) § 939.45 (6) and in STATE OF MARYLAND, FOURTIT AND
FINAL REPORT OF MARYLAND SELF-SunVEY CoMMIssioN, REIATIING TO Pno-
PosED CRIMIiNAL CODE (1960), in §§ 3 and 8 (i) (4) of the proposed code,
which preserves common law defenses not made explicit in the codes.
'05Model Penal Code (Prop. Off. Draft 1962) § 3.02 provides that where
no legislative purpose to exclude such general justification plainly appears
and the statute does not explicitly provide exceptions or defenses dealing
with the particular situation:
"Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that . . . the
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than
that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged. . . . When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing
about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in ap-
praising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by
this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which
recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability."
See the explanation for and the defense of the lack of precision in this
formulation In Model Penal Code (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958) § 3.02, comment
at 9-10.
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spontaneous growth and a theoretical completeness of oc-
cupancy of the field of whatever wrongdoing ought to be
punished by the state. What is gained is greater cer-
tainty, and accompanying this, greater fairness in appli-
cation of the law. Any necessary new legislation should
be possible before too many malefactors escape by being
just outside the clearer boundaries of a new code. The
central areas of criminality would remain unchanged by
a new code; the terminology would be largely either taken
over intact or derivative.
3. Would not radical change in our criminal law pro-
duce such chaos that the administration of criminal justice
would suffer severely, at least in the short run? It would
not. As was pointed out in answer to the previous ob-
jection, discussing the nature of our common law heritage,
the new code would derive largely from common law or
familiar old statutory offenses. For reasons stated in the
first section of this article, the body of articulated sub-
stantive criminal law in Maryland is small. Adoption of
the Model Penal Code, with its extensive notes, would
probably make legal research no more difficult than it
now is. Presumably, if a new code were adopted, inter-
ested members of the bar could obtain any necessary
orientation through short bar association programs of
instruction. Adoption of a new code should not produce
any crisis in the local criminal bar. Far from producing
chaos, it ought to bring order to such matters as crime
definition and imposition of punishment.106
4. Why pursue an impractical dream of perfection? To
expect to achieve perfection in the adoption of a new
criminal code would indeed be foolish. The most fore-
sighted legislators cannot hope to produce a code which
'0 Space does not permit discussion of the very interesting punishment
provisions of the Model Penal Code. Very generally, offenses (aside from
any that may be made capital) are divided into five classes, with ordinary
terms of maximum imprisonment as follows: felonies of the first degree,
life; felonies of the second degree, ten years; felonies of the third degree,
five years; misdemeanors, one year; and petty misdemeanors, thirty days.
Minimum terms for felonies are also provided, to be fixed by the court
at one to ten years for first degree felonies, one to three years for second
degree felonies, and one to two years for third degree felonies. Specified
extended terms of imprisonment are permitted for such persons as may
be (as defined by the code) persistent or multiple offenders, professional
criminals, or dangerous, mentally abnormal persons. An automatic parole
period of at least a year is required on release from prison for those
sentenced to a year or more. Wide discretion is allowed the trial judge in
granting probation in lieu of a sentence of imprisonment. Time off for
good behavior is allowed for imprisonment and parole periods. See Model
Penal Code (Proposed Off. Draft 1962) §§ 6.06-6.10, 7.01, 7.03, 7.04, 305.1 and
305.2.
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will solve perfectly all the problems it is designed to
solve - much less to forsee the problems which will ulti-
mately arise under it. But there is a considerable ad-
vantage in moving in the right direction; this can be done
and ought to be attempted. If Maryland attains an op-
timum product, the knowledge that this will still require
reconsideration and amendment should not be disturbing.
A proposal that we follow closely such a model as the
Model Penal Code is not impractical. This code is not
something produced in a flight of fancy by a bunch of
impractical dreamers; some of the ablest lawyers in the
country - including Maryland lawyers - participated in
the work. Anyone who examines the code carefully will,
despite specific reservations he may have as to some
particular provisions, recognize the high quality of think-
ing, the learning, and the resourcefulness that went into
it.
The obstacles to adoption of a new code are essentially
of two kinds. First, the profession, which to a large extent
is already aware of the inadequacies of the present Mary-
land criminal law, and the public need to be made aware
of the need for and the possibility of achievement of
change. Second, the more difficult task of assembling a
consensus in favor of a particular draft proposal remains.
There is bound to be strong disagreement about many
specific proposals that may be put forth; even a proposal
that nothing be changed will produce opposition. To take
only one example, whether or not the new code abolishes
capital punishment (a matter left open in the Model Penal
Code),1' it cannot avoid severe disappointment to one
faction or another. There are a number of points on which
such disagreement is likely. What is essential is that
enough people see that, despite some specific defeats for
their pet projects, the general advantage in adopting a
rational new code far outweighs the loss of specific points.
It is partly because of the natural disagreement about
particulars that the starting point is so important. When
no argument convinces most of the debaters, there is a
strong tendency to stay with the draft because departure
cannot be clearly justified. So that this tendency may
work to the advantage of solid accomplishment, the draft
must be the best that can be obtained.
See Model Penal Code (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) § 201.6, comment
at 65.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The present Maryland criminal law has a common law
base, considerably modified in detail, both before and after
the American Revolution, by specific, rather narrow legis-
lative contractions and expansions. The common law base,
where the central definitions are to be found, is often
vague. The statutory changes have been made piecemeal
and are not harmonious. No unified approach to the
criminal law has accomplished anything since the general
criminal legislation of 1809,"'8 and to the extent that any
order was achieved then, it was in the area of punish-
ments, an area which by now needs reconsideration as
much as the area of crime definition. Until the consti-
tutional amendment of 1950109 the inadequacies of the
criminal law were partly hidden by the local doctrine
giving the triers of fact in criminal cases unreviewable
discretion as to the definitions of the crimes before them.
Now these inadequacies are becoming obvious and pain-
ful.
The remedy is the adoption of a modern code. It should
not be based, in the matter of drafting, on the present
Maryland statutes, which (1) usually define important
crimes only by reference to the common law, (2) do not
reflect a well considered penalty scheme, and (3) have
no organization but that imposed by historical accident
and an alphabetical arrangement of crimes. A new code
might profitably be based on the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, now nearing completion. The ideas of
a modern code necessarily derive from our common law
heritage and would not be very difficult for a lawyer with
a knowledge of the present system to master. A modern
code differs from the common law (and from the Mary-
land combination of common and statutory law) in pro-
viding greater coherence and certainty, improved clarity of
expression, and thoughtfully considered changes where
the common law is obsolete. By using the Model Penal
Code as a first draft of a new Maryland code, and making
only those changes plainly warranted by local require-
ments, Maryland could produce an excellent new code
relatively quickly and relatively cheaply.
The objections to such a procedure prove, on examina-
tion, to be weak. Little or nothing that is good in our
present criminal law would be lost, and anything lost
would be compensated for by large gains.
10MD. LAWS 1809, Ch. 138.
MD. CONST., Art. XV, § 5.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
In debate before a Maryland Bar Association meeting
in 1907 it was said:110
"But I desire to say that, while the criminal law
may be a growth, it seems to me it is a mere fungus
growth. It seems to me that there are a great many
glaring defects in it which ought to be remedied....
We passed statutes to cure [some of] these evils and
the result is a crazy quilt ......
"[T]he criminal code of the State, granting as true all
the learned Attorney-General has said as to the
superiority of the development of the law by decisions
and interpretations, . . . is a law which is developed
by hodgepodge from statutes prompted for one reason
or another, and acts are defined as crimes to which
penalties are appended entirely out of proportion to
the offense."
Although the Association supported revision of the crim-
inal law, nothing more than the repeal of some obviously
obsolete statutes has been done in the way of reform of
the substantive law of crimes. It is about time to begin
moving.
110 REPORT or THE TWELFTH ANN-UAL MmEETING OF THE MARYLAND STATE
BAR ASSOCiATIoN (1907) 194, 196. The remarks in the first quoted para-
graph were by Judge Eugene O'Dunne; those in the second paragraph by
John Phelps, Esquire.
